CORPORATE CONCEALMENT OF TOBACCO HAZARDS - CHANGING MOTIVES AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTS

Explanations of corporate wrongdoing tend to fall into two competing c amps. Researchers of corporate behavior, on the one hand, emphasize th at bounded rationality is inherent in all responses of organizations t o their constantly changing environments. Criminologists, on the other hand, emphasize that corporations must rationally seek to meet their profit goals. We try to draw the best insights from both camps to expl ain one type of action: concealment by corporations of the known hazar ds of their products. Patterned historical differences are central to our analysis. Whereas motivations to continue developing and selling a product escalates rapidly over time, we argue, reasons to abandon it accumulate slowly. By the time this uneven race is complete, managers, organizations, and communities have strong motives and ability to sup press knowledge. They have ''too much invested to quit.'' We apply our explanation to three centuries of tobacco production, in order to exp lain the more recent history of blatant hazard concealment.