In 1951 C. I. Lewis published a logic of general terms (or properties)
that he called the calculus of predicates. Although this system is of
less significance than Lewis's earlier work on propositional modal lo
gic, it has considerable historical interest and does not deserve the
almost total neglect it has received. My aim here is to situate this s
ystem in the context of Lewis's earlier work and to examine several of
its central features. After sketching the historical background, I pr
esent the syntax of Lewis's system, discuss his reasons for preferring
it to quantified modal logic, and develop a semantics for it that is
suggested by Lewis's informal discussion of his system together with h
is general views on meaning. I then discuss Lewis's sketchy extension
of his system to include quantifiers and examine his claim that it can
serve as a foundation for logic in general. I conclude by noting two
minor changes in CP that, from today's vantage point, would count as i
mprovements.