WHEN A HAWK CAN DAMAGE A DOVE - AN EXTENSION OF GAME-THEORY

The classic hawk-dove game predicts that hawk is an Evolutionary Stabl e Strategy (ESS) when value(V) is greater than cost (C). This paper di scusses how the hawk-dove game is affected if a hawk can damage a dove , regardless of the dove's intentions to withdraw from a contest. The ability of a hawk to damage a dove significantly alters the expected p ayoffs for the participants with hawk now being an ESS when V < C, dep endent on the probability of a hawk being able to inflict damage on a dove. If this probability is greater than or equal to 0.5 then hawk is an ESS regardless of the ratio of value to cost. The conditions under which this type of game may actually occur in nature and how the game relates to human interactions are also discussed. (C) 1995 Academic P ress Limited