Using a national sample of public high schools, we find that bargainin
g spillovers play an important role in teachers' labor markets. The sp
illover variable consistently indicates a larger bargaining effect tha
n does the collective bargaining coverage dummy. We estimate that a 10
percent increase in the state density of teachers' unions increases t
he highest teacher salaries by 2.6 percent and the lowest by 0.2 perce
nt. Consistent with prior research, teacher union density was mast str
ongly associated with highest salaries and had a nonsignificant positi
ve association with lowest salaries. Teachers' unions also affect the
structural determinants of teachers' salaries, offering some additiona
l evidence supporting a median voter model. The proportion of unionize
d teachers with higher levels of education and experience (i.e., the h
ighest paid) is positively related to highest salaries. Finally, our r
esults confirm the importance of demand factors in teacher wage determ
ination.