AN ANALYTICAL PROCESS MODEL OF 2-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS

There has been a call to investigate the negotiation process (Gale 198 6, Shubik 1982), as it is felt that this would yield important insight s beyond those obtained by outcome-oriented theories (Roth 1979). This paper proposes a new analytical process model that captures both beha vioral and economic aspects related to two-party negotiations. The pro posed model, inspired by Pruitt's (1981) work, explicitly incorporates concepts which are both relevant and crucial, such as the negotiators ' power, concession points, aspiration level, limit, and time pressure . Based on this process model, it is possible to predict (1) condition s under which agreements will not be reached despite the existence of a zone of agreement, (2) conditions under which agreements will be rea ched, and (3) the patterns of the negotiators' offers and counteroffer s.