EFFECTIVE CHOICE IN THE SINGLE-SHOT PRISONERS-DILEMMA TOURNAMENT

Citation
D. Nauta et J. Hoekstra, EFFECTIVE CHOICE IN THE SINGLE-SHOT PRISONERS-DILEMMA TOURNAMENT, Theory and decision, 39(1), 1995, pp. 1-30
Citations number
17
Categorie Soggetti
Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods
Journal title
ISSN journal
00405833
Volume
39
Issue
1
Year of publication
1995
Pages
1 - 30
Database
ISI
SICI code
0040-5833(1995)39:1<1:ECITSP>2.0.ZU;2-T
Abstract
This paper discusses the results of a single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma c omputer tournament. In the single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma tournament e ach pair of players interacts only once. But players can establish and detect reputations because they know how their current opponent has b ehaved in previous games with other players. The results show that coo peration is worthwhile, even in single-shot games, provided the outcom es of previous games are common knowledge.