POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY FOR FEDERAL APPOINTMENT - THE CASE OF DEPARTINGMEMBERS OF THE US HOUSE-OF-REPRESENTATIVES, 1951-1992

This article investigates whether the opportunity for presidential app ointment influences the congressional career. We discover that more th an 16% of the House members who retired or suffered electoral defeat f rom 1961 to 1992 received a federal appointment. The likelihood of app ointment rises to 28% if only departing representatives from the presi dent's party are considered. For members of the president's party, leg islative loyalty and losing a Senate bid significantly increase the pr obability of appointment. We also find evidence of a cabinet norm in t he appointment process since more than half of the appointed represent atives had congressional committee experience within the policy jurisd iction of their federal appointment. Our results have implications for research on progressive ambition, voluntary retirement, and the feder al bureaucracy.