The study of corporate governance has expanded both its theoretical an
d its empirical scope. We define governance broadly to include the soc
ial organization of firms and their relations to their suppliers, cust
omers, competitors, and states. This review examines both economic and
sociological theories to evaluate their efficacy at accounting for th
e comparative data on firms. Our review of the comparative literature
suggests that there is no evidence of convergence across societies tow
ard a single form of governance, and that this is mainly a function of
three factors: the timing of entry into industrialization and the ins
titutionalization of that process, the role of states in regulating pr
operty rights and rules of cooperation and competition between firms,
and the social organization of national elites. The theories that func
tion best are those that consider political, institutional, and evolut
ionary factors as causal. This is a cautious conclusion as many of the
theories have not been evaluated because of the difficulty in produci
ng comparative measures.