T. Besley et A. Case, DOES ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AFFECT ECONOMIC-POLICY CHOICES - EVIDENCE FROM GUBERNATORIAL TERM LIMITS, The Quarterly journal of economics, 110(3), 1995, pp. 769-798
This paper analyzes the behavior of U. S. governors from 1950 to 1986
to investigate a reputation-building model of political behavior. We a
rgue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding
term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of va
riation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency
model. We find evidence that taxes, spending, and other policy instrum
ents respond to a binding term limit if a Democrat is in office. The r
esult is a fiscal cycle in term-limit states, which lowers state incom
e when the term limit binds.