FEMINISM AND EPISTEMOLOGY - WHAT KIND OF SUCCESSOR SCIENCE

In this paper, I address recent feminist epistemological claims - in p articular, those associated with 'standpoint theory' and 'feminist pos tmodernism' - arguing that they share difficulties with other forms of anti-positivist social theory and contribute to an impasse in social inquiry which is becoming increasingly acute. This impasse is traced t o the displacement of explanation from the centre of theoretical conce rns. In arguing this, I am not, however, proposing a return to positiv ist social science. The view that explanation can be equated with posi tivism that 'empirical' equals 'empiricism' - is a common misconceptio n It has led some advocates of a distinct feminist epistemology to des cribe much research on gender issues as 'feminist empiricism'. Such re search, they argue, involves a paradoxical or contradictory reliance u pon the very 'masculine' epistemological criteria which feminist theor y has done so much to challenge. In this paper I shall criticise this argument, proposing instead a 'post-positivist' position in which empi rical research is at the heart of any feminist challenge to mainstream approaches and the reconstruction of social theory.