A THEORY OF ESCALATION AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Escalation processes are found in many types of international conflict . However, a great deal of the theoretical and empirical literature on escalation is context specific and concentrates on explaining the out comes of an escalation process. This approach has generated numerous i nsights; however, our understanding of escalation processes, in genera l, remains partial and incomplete. In this article, the author develop s a two-sided incomplete information model to identify the kinds of es calation strategies states are likely to adopt in conflict. The model produces several hypotheses, one of which is tested empirically in the context of militarized interstate disputes. The hypothesis states tha t as the disparity between the players' cost tolerances increases, the lower cost tolerant actor is more likely to escalate to the maximum o f his or her ability on the first move in the conflict. The results of the test confirm the theory's expectations of an inverse relationship between cost tolerance and an actor's escalation behavior. The articl e concludes by noting implications for future research on escalation p rocesses.