ON DISTINGUISHING PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS FROM THE REPRESENTATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF MIND

Authors
KATZ LD
Citation
Ld. Katz, ON DISTINGUISHING PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS FROM THE REPRESENTATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF MIND, Behavioral and brain sciences, 18(2), 1995, pp. 258-259
Citations number
1
Categorie Soggetti
Psychology,Neurosciences,"Behavioral Sciences
Journal title
Behavioral and brain sciences → ACNP
ISSN journal
0140525X
Volume
18
Issue
2
Year of publication
1995
Pages
258 - 259
Database
ISI
SICI code
0140-525X(1995)18:2<258:ODPCFT>2.0.ZU;2-A
Abstract
One can share Block's aim of distinguishing ''phenomenal'' experience from cognitive function and agree with much in his views, yet hold tha t the inclusion of representational content within phenomenal content, if only in certain spatial cases, obscures this distinction. It may a lso exclude some modular theories, although it is interestingly sugges tive of what may be the limits of the phenomenal penetration of the re presentational mind.