COALITION TERMINATION AND THE STRATEGIC TIMING OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Cabinet coalitions in multiparty parliamentary democracies lead a prec arious existence. Legislative majorities can typically dismiss the cab inet at will and can sometimes force early elections through parliamen tary dissolution. Since coalition termination can have substantial pol itical consequences, it is important to understand when and why such d ecisions are made. To this end, we develop a model of coalition bargai ning in a legislature with dismissal and dissolution powers. We use th e model to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for both coali tion termination and parliamentary dissolution. In contrast to several widely held maxims, we find that coalition terminations need not be t he automatic consequence of exogenous shocks. Nor do opportunistic par ties with favorable electoral prospects always dissolve parliament to enhance their power. Instead, decisions to terminate coalitions or cal l new elections result from party leaders' rational responses to the c onstraints of legislative and electoral institutions and the anticipat ed feelings of the electorate.