VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER A NEGLIGENCE RULE

Authors
Citation
Cyc. Chu et Yy. Qian, VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER A NEGLIGENCE RULE, International review of law and economics, 15(3), 1995, pp. 305-322
Citations number
13
Categorie Soggetti
Economics,Law
ISSN journal
01448188
Volume
15
Issue
3
Year of publication
1995
Pages
305 - 322
Database
ISI
SICI code
0144-8188(1995)15:3<305:VLUANR>2.0.ZU;2-U
Abstract
The previous literature has shown that if the agent has limited assets , the vicarious liability law under a strict liability rule can effect ively make the principal monitor her agent, and induce the agent to ta ke more care, which thereby reduces the social cost. In practice the n egligence rule still applies to many tort cases, and the principal's m onitoring evidence is often needed to prove the agent's negligence. It is possible that the principal will conceal the monitoring evidence f rom the court in order to avoid the vicarious liability. In such a cas e the society has to incur higher investigation cost than otherwise. T o save the investigation cost, the court may want to provide incentive s to induce honest reports either by lowering the due care level, or b y lowering the level of vicarious liability.