PROSPECTS FOR THE AGREED FRAMEWORK - WHAT DO WE DO NOW

The US-DPRK Agreed Framework is generally considered the ''best'' of a bad set of options to deal with North Korea's nuclear program. The Ag reed Framework has many serious weaknesses, including a delayed invest igation of past North Korean nuclear activity, leaving South-North dia logue out of the web of interlocking steps taken by both sides, not sp ecifying what security assurances would be granted, and, most importan tly, not specifying special inspections in the document itself. While these inadequacies exist, the Agreed Framework should still be support ed. If the framework were to collapse, the best available alternative at that time would be a return to economic sanctions, an inferior, alt hough potentially necessary option. First, the United States Congress may not provide the necessary funding for the framework and the admini stration might not be able to generate the funding internationally. Se cond, Pyongyang may break the agreement. Under any circumstances, it i s clear that North Korea will continuously attempt to extract every po ssible extra concession at every conceivable turn-from Washington and from Seoul. In case the framework does collapse, and to encourage Pyon gyang to abide by it in the meantime, a contingency plan for sanctions against the DPRK must be prepared. While military strikes are not a v iable option, graduated economic sanctions are the best conceivable al ternative. If Pyongyang does not live up to its end of the bargain, al l major international actors should support this alternative. In order to prepare for this contingency, the United States and South Korea mu st also prepare more realistic reenforcement plans for the Combined Fo rces in Korea to deal with the real risks involved in implementing san ctions. In the meantime, the author proposes a number of steps all sid es can take to encourage the prospects for success of the Agreed Frame work. These include: generating greater bipartisan support for the fra mework in the United States, repeated requests for earlier access to t he two nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon, a greater willingness to use t he leverage, both ''carrots'' and ''sticks'' that we hold over Pyongya ng to deal with their repeated requests for further concessions; and, most importantly, an assurance from the Clinton administration that fu ture US defense budgets will be sufficient to ensure that the United S tates can fight and win two major regional wars simultaneously.