THE PROSPECTS FOR CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

This paper considers the prospects for both limited and major conventi onal conflict on the Korean peninsula. The cases considered involve No rth Korea as the aggressor against the Combined Forces Command (CFC) o f South Korea and the United States. With any conflict started by Nort h Korea, a key issue would be the North Korean objectives. These canno t be determined with precision, given the character of the North Korea n regime. But the likely objectives provide a framework for postulatin g North Korean strategy and operational concepts, and the North Korean assessment of whether these approaches could achieve its objectives. A major North Korean conventional attack is examined using both theate r-level modeling and other forms of military assessment. Because of bo th CFC preparation and South Korean and US commitment, a North Korean major conventional attack appears very likely to fail: It does not app ear capable of penetrating the forward CFC ground defenses, and even i f it could, CFC air forces could stop a North Korean advance well shor t of its objectives. Overcoming these CFC strengths would require the use of weapons of far more lethality, such as chemical and perhaps bio logical weapons (in addition to conventional weapons), though their us e raises other problems for North Korea. The prospects for success of even this alternative are uncertain and the risk so great that such a conflict is unlikely to develop as a purposeful North Korean effort at expansion, but cannot be ruled out as a North Korean act of desperati on. It is also possible that some form of limited conflict could occur either as an isolated event or as a precursor to a major conflict in Korea. Such attacks could occur in various circumstances, such as a No rth Korean response to some form of sanctions that may yet occur if it becomes recalcitrant on the nuclear weapon issue. The costs of even a limited conflict could be very high. The CFC must carefully evaluate the kinds of limited attacks that North Korea could commit, and determ ine appropriate responses that avoid: (1) encouraging further North Ko rean attacks and (2) overreacting to North Korean provocation. Overrea cting could lead to an escalation spiral that could plunge the Korean peninsula into a major war.