STRATEGIC METAMORPHOSIS FROM SISYPHUS TO CHAMELEON - NORTH-KOREAN SECURITY POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

National security is basically an ambiguous symbol. Like a chameleon, it has been determined by the supreme decision maker of a nation, depe nding upon the given spatial and temporal conditions. Nevertheless, na tional security has been conventionally understood to protect, presenc e and defend the lives and properties of the people and their territor y. To put it differently, it has meant military defense from the exter nal military threat. But since the end of War II, its meaning has been extended beyond any material damage to include the protection of the vital values of a nation. Then, the protection of existing vital natio nal values through the maintenance of the status quo is the first impe rative for government policy, which can employ all kinds of means: pol itical, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and military methods. Among th ose methods, the military one has been referred to as military strateg y. The military strategy of most nations adopted a defensive attitude, namely deterrence to maintain the status quo, which is the first obje ctive of their security policies. Historically, only the nations with revisionist and expansionist goals adopt an offensive military strateg y. Such nations were many in history, but they have been rare during s pecific periods. North Korea has been one of these nations. With an ex panded definition of security-the communization of the whole Korean pe ninsula-the Kim II Sung regime has tried to achieve this anti-status q uo positive goal by means of military power, but has failed. For him, war is continuation of the revolution by other means. He can be said t o have followed the principle of simplicity in military strategy by co nsistently pursuing communist unification. However, a chance for the u nification of the Korean peninsula by means of a second surprise attac k has not come. The continuous presence of American troops in South Ko rea has almost certainly assured North Korea of another defeat. Howeve r, Kim Il Sung's belief in and adherence to a revolutionary war dogma made him almost blind to the need for being faithful to the South-Nort h dialogue. Kim Il Sung has waited for a fortuitous opportunity to com e. He believed that after the complete pullout of US troops from South Korea, the ''center of gravity'' of South Korea would return to Seoul and be limited there. He then would be able to gain a victory in his revolutionary war through an offensive strategy as the North Vietnames e did. He waited for the culminating point of offensive, holding the c ommunist view that history was on his side. However, history has turne d out to be not on his side. By the present moment, the Kim jong-il re gime has not yet presented the new security policy. It is not clear wh ether North Korea will abandon the ultimate goal it has continued to p ursue during the past half a century, that is, the communization of th e Korean peninsula, or will change its military from offensive to defe nsive strategy by adapting the deployment of its military forces. Howe ver, one thing is clear that it will never be easy for the North Korea n regime to change radically its traditional military strategy. North Korea has pursued the goal of communist unification of the whole Korea n peninsula by military forces like a Sisyphus. The glaringly increasi ng gap between its goal and its ceaseless efforts might lead one to ap ply Santayana's definition of a fanatic, rather than the myth of Sisyp hus, as one who redoubles his efforts as he moves further away from hi s goal. In any case, a Sisyphus cannot become a chameleon at will, bec ause of the law of inertia also works in the political world.