SOUTH-KOREA DEFENSE INDUSTRY AT THE CROSSROADS

The pattern of arms production in the developing world has often been described as a series of gradual and progressive steps leading to grea ter self-sufficiency in the design, development, and manufacturing of weapon systems. The development of the defense industry in the Republi c of Korea has been a near-textbook example of this process. Starting with almost no arms production in the early 1970s, South Korea by the mid-1990s had built up one of the most impressive defense industrial b ases in the developing world. Since the mid-1980s, South Korea has inc reasingly emphasized the indigenous development and design, as well as the local production, of weapon systems. The ROK has initiated severa l ambitious indigenous arms programs, including local production of th e American F-16 fighter. At the same time, South Korea faces mounting obstacles as it attempts to progress up the ''ladder of production'' t oward greater autonomy in defense production. The country's defense in dustrial base is heavily overcapacitized and still highly dependent on foreign technology. Several barriers to the further indigenization of arms production can be identified, including (1) a low level of inter est on the part of South Korean private industry in over-involving its elf in arms production; (2) a preference on the part of the ROK milita ry for license-producing foreign weapon systems over devoting signific ant time and resources to support indigenous research and development; and (3) various structural weaknesses in the ROK defense R&D base, in cluding poor linkages between the defense R&D and manufacturing bases, a passive management system in local military production, weak design and systems integration skills, and a lack of long-range R&D planning . The ROK arms industries presently appear to be at a ''technology pla teau,'' and as South Korean indigenization efforts expand, so do the h oles in its defense industrial base become more egregious. Weapons man ufacturing does not necessarily get any easier the further up the ladd er one progresses. At the same time, South Korea is not likely to aban don its indigenous arms industries or its ambitions to become more sel f-sufficient in weapons design and development. Local defense industri es are still perceived to be important national assets, essential to e nsuring a secure and reliable source of arms for national defense, as well as a driver of considerable high-tech activities. In addition, th e overall technological advancement of the ROK is continuing, and loca l high-technology industries could help underwrite further indigenizat ion efforts. In the long run, overcoming the technology plateau may be less a technological problem for the ROK than a bureaucratic, organiz ational, and structural one.