Te. Olsen et G. Torsvik, INTERTEMPORAL COMMON AGENCY AND ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN - HOW MUCH DECENTRALIZATION, European economic review, 39(7), 1995, pp. 1405-1428
In common agency, where one agent contracts with several principals, t
o what extent should the principals cooperate and centralize provision
of incentives? If the agency is over contract complements - where an
increase in activity for one principal increases the marginal value of
contracting with other principals - complete centralization seems opt
imal, since this internalizes all externalities. We show that this int
uition is not generally valid for dynamic agency situations. For altho
ugh centralization provides more accurate incentives to the agent, it
also aggravates the ratchet effect, and this negative effect may domin
ate. The optimal degree of decentralization is discussed and partly ch
aracterized.