CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE COMMITMENT OF THE US MILITARY

Control over deployment of U.S. armed forces has been one of the most hotly contested issues in foreign policy between the president and Con gress in recent years. Yet despite the lingering legacy of Vietnam, Co ngress has never fully forced presidents to curtail U.S. military acti vities through use of the War Powers Resolution, its appropriations po wers, or other legislation. I attempt to show that although Congress g enerally leaves military policy to the executive branch, it occasional ly tries to interject itself into policy-making when there are suffici ent political incentives. I develop a model to explain what leads Cong ress to periodically use the War Powers Resolution and other legislati on in an attempt to curtail U.S. military operations abroad, and find that public opinion, protracted conflicts, divided government, and vio lence against United States citizens all exercise statistically signif icant impacts on congressional behavior.