This article addresses the problem of evidence for Puccetti's hypothes
is of normal dual consciousness, i.e., the hypothesis that a stream of
consciousness flows in each cerebral hemisphere when both are functio
ning normally in intact, healthy people. Evidence counts as supportive
only if it is not explainable by a certain close alternative hypothes
is that holds consciousness to proceed in the nondominant hemisphere o
nly when the dominant hemisphere is unable to inhibit it (e.g., comple
te commissurotomy, dominant hemispherectomy, dominant anesthesia). Fro
m this perspective, I discuss (a) two experiments involving anesthesia
of the dominant hemisphere that were proposed, respectively, by Wilso
n and Puccetti, (b) an actual experiment on normal, unanesthetized sub
jects reported by Landis, Graves, and Goodglass, as well as (c) a furt
her kind of experiment which, I suggest, may discriminate between the
hypotheses. Assuming Puccetti is right, this experiment should yield a
distinct pattern of reports from the dominant hemisphere about its ex
periences of acting as the individual deals with different kinds of ta
sks (''nondominant'' vs. ''dominant''). Also considered is the common
(negative) introspective evidence to the effect that we have only a si
ngle stream, never two distinct experiences at the same time. I argue,
in support of Puccetti, that this is as it should be because introspe
ction-at-a-distance is impossible; privileged access is internal to a
stream, never occurs between streams.