EFFECTS OF TORT-LIABILITY AND INSURANCE ON HEAVY DRINKING AND DRINKING AND DRIVING

Using self-reported data on patterns of alcohol use among individuals from the 1989-90 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveys, this study investigat es effects of tort liability and third- and first-party insurance, alc ohol prices, and criminal sanctions on frequency of binge drinking and driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Requiring drivers to pu rchase third-party insurance discouraged binge drinking, especially in states combining compulsory insurance with a surcharge for a DUI. Imp lementation of no-fault laws and switching from contributory to compar ative negligence increased binge drinking, while higher alcohol prices reduced it. With one exception, neither tort nor nontort deterrents a ffected the fraction of bingeing episodes after which the individual d rove. Overall, it appears that deterrence of DUI is achieved by curbin g behavior that leads to DUI, namely, binge drinking. Once individuals engage in binge drinking, it appears that many policies designed to b e deterrents have little influence.