RATIONALIST EXPLANATIONS FOR WAR

Realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states ca n and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both wou ld prefer to war. Against this view, I show that under very broad cond itions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight. Popular rat ionalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less co stly bargain. Essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms. The first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it. The second turns on the fact that in spe cific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to up hold a mutually preferable bargain. Historical examples suggest that b oth mechanisms are empirically plausible.