Several criticisms of the argument from potential are reported. It is
noted that such criticisms are inspired by two similarly wrong interpr
etations of potentiality, one confusing it with possibility and anothe
r with probability. A brief analysis of the original Aristotelian cont
ext in which the concept emerged shows that potentiality cannot be tho
ught of as indicating the provision of some empirical facts in the fut
ure, but must rather be referred to the inherent ontological structure
of the being in question. It is then argued that such an Aristotelian
concept can be useful to express the dynamic structure of the person,
as it must be understood according to contemporary phenomenological p
ersonalism. In the light of this philosophical tradition, the embryo c
an be viewed as a being already possessing the human nature and active
ly developing its potential for personhood: it also follows that human
nature must not be understood as a static and predetermined essence,
but rather as the principle of becoming and movement toward further ac
hievements.