THE VALUES OF LIFE - DISCUSSION

In Life's Dominion Dworkin aims at defusing the controversy about abor tion and euthanasia by redefining its terms. Basically it is not a dis pute about the right to life, but about its value. Liberals should gra nt that human life has not only a personal, but also an intrinsic valu e; conservatives should accept the principle of toleration which requi res to let people decide for themselves about matters of intrinsic val ue. Dworkin fails, however, to distinguish between two kinds of person al value: (1) the value of something to a person, when he actually or dispositionally desires it, or finds it pleasant; and (2) the value of something to a person, when it 'objectively' contributes to his wellb eing, as defined by reference to his personal point of view, whether o r no the ever perceives it as so contributing. He also fails to distin guish between two meanings of the concept of intrinsic value': (3) ult imate, i.e. non-instrumental personal value of kind (2); (4) the imper sonal value of something which is not good-for-anybody, but simply goo d, i.e. not a constituent of someone's well-being. Dworkin argues that the human fetus from conception onwards has a value, that it is not a personal value of kind (1), and therefore must be an intrinsic value. But the value of the life of the fetus is not a personal value of kin d (2) either and therefore not an intrinsic value of kind (3): it is n ormally a constituent of the well-being of the pregnant woman, but tha t doesn't constitute its value, and it is not good 'for' the fetus its elf in the relevant sense, because it doesn't have a personal point of view. If, however, the fetus' life is allowed to have an intrinsic va lue of kind (4), the conservative cannot be refuted by appeal to the p rinciple of toleration,for this only concerns intrinsic value of kind (3). The liberal, indeed, should recognize that the fetus' life has a value, but it is neither a personal value (1) or (2), nor an impersona l value (4), but rather a relational value which gradually develops fr om some point substantially later than conception.