ON ADMISSIBLE STRATEGIES AND MANIPULATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE PROCEDURES

Authors
MBIH B
Citation
B. Mbih, ON ADMISSIBLE STRATEGIES AND MANIPULATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE PROCEDURES, Theory and decision, 39(2), 1995, pp. 169-188
Citations number
8
Categorie Soggetti
Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods
Journal title
Theory and decision → ACNP
ISSN journal
00405833
Volume
39
Issue
2
Year of publication
1995
Pages
169 - 188
Database
ISI
SICI code
0040-5833(1995)39:2<169:OASAMO>2.0.ZU;2-G
Abstract
A collective choice mechanism can be viewed as a game in normal form; in this article it is shown, for very attractive rules and for sets wi th any number of alternatives, how individuals involved in a collectiv e decision problem can construct the preferences they choose to expres s. An example is given with a version of plurality rule. Manipulabilit y results are deduced from such a characterization.