In noncooperative networks users make control decisions that optimize
their individual performance measure. Focusing on routing, two methodo
logies for architecting noncooperative networks are devised, that impr
ove the overall network performance. These methodologies are motivated
by problem settings arising in the provisioning acid the run time pha
ses of the network. For either phase, Nash equilibria characterize the
operating point of the network. The goal in the provisioning phase is
to allocate link capacities that lead to systemwide efficient Nash eq
uilibria. The solution of such design problems is, in general, counter
intuitive, since adding link capacity might lead to degradation of use
r performance. For systems of parallel links, it is shown that such pa
radoxes cannot occur and that the optimal solution coincides with the
solution in the single-user case, Extensions to general network topolo
gies are derived. During the run time phase, a manager controls the ro
uting of part of the network flow. The manager is aware of the noncoop
erative behavior of the users and makes its routing decisions based on
this information while aiming at improving the overall system perform
ance. We obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for enforcing an e
quilibrium that coincides with the global network optimum, and indicat
e that these conditions are met in many cases of interest.