CONGRESSIONAL TURNOVER - NEGATING THE INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE

Objective. Public concern over a seemingly intransigent and insensitiv e Congress has rekindled interest in raising the rate of turnover in t hat body. This paper investigates two approaches, term limits and spen ding limits, and how campaign strategies are affected when such rules are in place. Methods. Viewing congressional campaigns as rent-seeking games, strategic responses to certain rule changes (spending and tenu re ceilings) are explored theoretically. These theoretical results the n guide some empirical measures using data from the 1980 elections. Re sults. Term limits reduce the benefits of holding office, which, in tu rn, reduce the effort put forth in capturing that office. This effect, however, is asymmetrical with incumbents responding more than challen gers. Spending limits disproportionately affect challengers, but when long-term effects are considered the ''incumbency protection'' they pr ovide is much smaller than previously suggested. Conclusions. Term lim its are expected to result in greater congressional turnover with less money being spent on campaigns than in the absence of such a rule. Sp ending limits can indeed be used to level the electoral playing field especially if the limits take into account the impact of incumbent spe nding in previous elections on the current campaign.