It is a common assumption that one type of Gricean error-interpreting
the quantifier ''some'' as being incompatible with a situation in whic
h ''all'' is the case-is an important factor in determining errors in
syllogistic reasoning. However, the errors that would be predicted by
Gricean theory were found to be surprisingly rare in a reanalysis of p
reviously published research on syllogisms. In a series of four experi
ments, it is demonstrated that Gricean errors are common in simple, in
terpretational tasks but become less common as the logical demands of
the task increase; and they seem to be virtually nonexistent in syllog
istic reasoning tasks. The results are interpreted in terms of mental
models theory under the assumption that increasing task complexity lea
ds to greater elaboration of preliminary models. (C) 1995 Academic Pre
ss, Inc.