MONSTER ANALOGIES

Analogy has a rich history in Western civilization. Over the centuries , it has become reified in that analogical reasoning has sometimes bee n regarded as a fundamental cognitive process. In addition, it has bec ome identified with a particular expressive format. The limitations of the modern view are illustrated by monster analogies, which show that analogy need not be regarded as something having a single form, forma t, or semantics. Analogy clearly does depend on the human ability to c reate and use well-defined or analytic formats for laying out proposit ions that express or imply meanings and perceptions. Beyond this depen dence, research in cognitive science suggests that analogy relies on a number of genuinely fundamental cognitive capabilities, including sem antic flexibility, the perception of resemblances and of distinctions, imagination, and metaphor. Extant symbolic models of analogical reaso ning have various sorts of limitation, yet each model presents some im portant insights and plausible mechanisms. I argue that future efforts could be aimed at integration. This aim would include the incorporati on of contextual information, the construction of semantic bases that are dynamic and knowledge rich, and the incorporation of multiple appr oaches to the problems of inference constraint.