Two experiments (N = 71) compare lay standards of insanity to standard
s incorporated in American legal codes. In Experiment 1, case vignette
s provided only legally relevant information about defendants' degrees
of impairment in cognition or in behavioral control. Respondents' jud
gments of criminal liability or not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI
) reflected an exculpatory standard of substantial impairment in both
cognition and control. In Experiment 2, case vignettes provided realis
tic information about defendants' psychiatric diagnoses; respondents h
ad to infer levels of cognitive and control impairment. Results showed
that respondents made highly idiosyncratic inferences based on diagno
stic categories, but once made, these inferences predicted NGRI judgme
nts. Implications of the concordance between laypeople's rules for ass
igning NGRI verdicts and the rules used in American legal codes are di
scussed.