ON STABILIZATION PLANS AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE

Citation
Ia. Mourmouras et Dm. Su, ON STABILIZATION PLANS AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE, Applied economics, 27(10), 1995, pp. 967-971
Citations number
5
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
ISSN journal
00036846
Volume
27
Issue
10
Year of publication
1995
Pages
967 - 971
Database
ISI
SICI code
0003-6846(1995)27:10<967:OSPACB>2.0.ZU;2-V
Abstract
We argue that the benefits of appointing an independent central banker may go beyond low inflation rates. Within a government debt stabiliza tion framework and with a decentralized policy making where the govern ment acts as a Stackelberg leader, delegating monetary policy to an in dependent authority turns out to be a discipline for the government, a nd overall this leads to better results.