The working hypothesis of the paper is that motor images are endowed w
ith the same properties as those of the (corresponding) motor represen
tations, and therefore have the same functional relationship to the im
agined or represented movement and the same causal role in the generat
ion of this movement. The fact that the timing of simulated movements
follows the same constraints as that of actually executed movements is
consistent with this hypothesis. Accordingly, many neural mechanisms
are activated during motor imagery, as revealed by a sharp increase in
tendinous reflexes in the limb imagined to move, and by vegetative ch
anges which correlate with the level of mental effort. At the cortical
level, a specific pattern of activation, that closely resembles that
of action execution, is observed in areas devoted to motor control. Th
is activation might be the substrate for the effects of mental trainin
g. A hierarchical model of the organization of action is proposed: thi
s model implies a short-term memory storage of a 'copy' of the various
representational steps. These memories are erased when an action corr
esponding to the represented goal takes place. By contrast, if the act
ion is incompletely or not executed, the whole system remains activate
d, and the content of the representation is rehearsed. This mechanism
would be the substrate for conscious access to this content during mot
or imagery and mental training.