SELF-INTEREST, EQUITY, AND CRIME-CONTROL - A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL DECISION-MAKING

Employing the analytic technique of game theory, we attempt to answer questions about how individuals with different proclivities to use cri me to accomplish ends, and different beliefs about society's fairness, are likely to respond to different incentives and disincentives that are derived from strain and neoclassical deterrence theories. Our anal ysis indicates that the crime control policies typically recommended b y adherents of both theories are often logically invalid, given the pr emises upon which they are supposedly based. For example, our analysis suggests why punishment strategies like ''three strikes and you're ou t'' and ''entitlement strategies'' such as welfare and other short-ter m redistributive payment programs fail to deter crime. Finally, after including notions of equity with traditional rational choice assumptio ns, our analysis identifies a mb of theoretically derived strategies t hat may more effectively deter crime.