The problem of estimating cosmological parameters such as Omega from n
oisy or incomplete data is an example of inverse problems and, as such
, generally requires a probabilistic approach. We adopt the Bayesian i
nterpretation of probability for such problems and stress the connecti
on between probability and information which this approach makes expli
cit. This connection is important even when information is 'minimal' o
r, in other words, when we need to argue from a state of maximum ignor
ance. We use the transformation group method of Jaynes to assign minim
ally-informative prior probability measure for cosmological parameters
in the simple example of a dust Friedmann model, showing that the usu
al statements of the cosmological flatness problem are based on an ina
ppropriate choice of prior. We further demonstrate that, in the framew
ork of a classical cosmological model, there is no flatness problem.