A PRESIDENCY-AUGMENTED MODEL OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS ON HOUSE ROLL CALL VOTES

Theory: A ''presidency-augmented'' model of presidential-congressional relations is compared to the ''Congress-centered'' model as explanati ons of variation in presidential success on roll call votes in the Hou se. Hypotheses: (1) Presidents should will more on votes concerning 'o n agenda' bills and bills they support than on ''off agenda'' bills or bills they oppose. (2) ''On agenda'' votes should receive more suppor t from the president's congressional leaders than ''off agenda'' votes . (3) Compared to minority party presidents, a larger share of the bil ls on which majority party presidents take positions should be ''on ag enda'' and be bills they support. (4) Party support for the president should be higher when congressional leaders support the president than when the leaders are divided or oppose the president. Methods: Probit and difference of means tests of roll call voting data collected from Congressional Quarterly. Results: Models that take presidential actio ns into account explain variations in presidential success better than the more simple ''Congress-centered'' model.