WHY I AM NOT A NONANTHROPOCENTRIST - CALLICOTT AND THE FAILURE OF MONISTIC INHERENTISM

I contrast two roles for environmental philosophers-''applied philosop hy'' and ''practical philosophy''-and show that the strategy of applie d philosophy encourages an axiological and monistic approach to theory building. I argue that the mission of applied philosophy, and the mon istic theory defended by J. Baird Callicott, in particular, tends to s eparate philosophers and their problems from real management issues be cause applied philosophers and moral monists insist that theoretical e xploration occurs independent of, and prior to, applications in partic ular situations. This separation of theory and practice suggests that philosophers are likely to be effective in policy discussions only to the degree that they can offer unquestioned theories that adjudicate r eal problems. Callicott offers his monistic, ontological approach as u niversal guidance to environmental activists and decision makers, argu ing that ecosystems and communities are moral subjects that can ''own' ' their own inherent value. Callicott's theory, however, faces a cruci al, unanswered theoretical dilemma which illustrates the impossibility of the dual task Callicott has set for his theory-to provide a single , ontological unification of ethics under nonanthropocentric holism an d to capture the fine nuances of ethical obligations as experienced in varied communities. I also show that monistic assumptions have led to an unfortunate interpretation of Aldo Leopold's land ethic and that a pluralist and pragmatist direction is likely to provide a more effica cious and theoretically defensible direction for further study of envi ronmental philosophy in a more practical mode.