THE DESPOTIC DISTRIBUTION AND DEFERRED MATURITY - 2 SIDES OF THE SAMECOIN

For an individual, the decision on when to settle (i.e., at what age) cannot be separated from the decision on where to settle (i.e.. in whi ch habitat). We tackle both problems simultaneously by treating territ ory settlement in the long-lived oystercatcher Haematopus ostralegus ( in which territories differ strikingly in quality and many individuals delay settlement) as a career decision with long-term fitness consequ ences through its effect on social status. We reject the hypothesis th at oystercatchers are not able to judge territory quality or that shor t-term advantages of a high-quality territory are offset by long-term costs. We estimate the expected future reproductive success (EFRS) of birds of different social status on the basis of a Markov model.A simp le contest model shows that owners of high-quality territories must ha ve a considerable advantage that allows them to despotically exclude o ther birds. We find no evidence for a phenotypic superiority of owners of high-quality territories. Also, the act of breeding, even in a poo r territory, does not enhance the probability of subsequently settling in a good territory. The available data support the queue hypothesis that unsettled individuals must develop site dominance in order to ove rcome the owner advantage. By queuing for a specific territory, an ind ividual reduces its chances of becoming established elsewhere. At evol utionary equilibrium, the local queues for high-quality territories ar e longer, which implies longer waiting times and a higher probability of premature death. This trade-off between territory quality and waiti ng time links the despotic distribution to deferred maturity and provi des a partial explanation for both.