Memory for subject-performed tasks-that is, for simple actions such as
Lifting a pen, which subjects perform overtly-is better than memory f
or verbal tasks-that is, when subjects only listen to the action phras
es. Here I investigated whether this effect depends on actual performa
nce or whether it also shows up when there is only an intention to per
form the task. Koriat, Ben-Zur, and Nussbaum (1990) found that the int
ention to perform items at test enhanced free recall more than did ver
bal tasks. Brooks and Gardiner (1994), however, were not able to repli
cate this finding. Ln four experiments, I attempted to reconcile this
discrepancy by comparing subject-performed tasks, to-be-performed task
s, and verbal tasks under different conditions. The outcome depended o
n whether a within-subjects design or a between-subjects design was us
ed. In the between-subjects design, memory for subject-performed tasks
was better than memory for to-be-performed tasks, and both of these l
ed to better recall performance than did verbal tasks. In a within-sub
jects design, in contrast, memory for to-be-performed tasks was no dif
ferent from memory for verbal tasks. These results were independent of
whether the test mode was congruent or incongruent. Thus, the discrep
ant findings of Koriat et al. and of Brooks and Gardiner seem to be du
e to the design used, pointing to encoding processes as the critical v
ariable. The present results are interpreted to show that actual perfo
rmance of actions at study provides more information than does only th
e intention to perform actions at test.