Economic crisis, historical traumas, the end of the Cold War, multinat
ionality and rapidly expanding nationalisms had by 1991 made Yugoslavi
a explosive, with three interacting sub-conflicts (north, Bosnia, sout
h), each with its own dynamics. The diaspora Serbs wanted to retain Yu
goslavia, with Great Serbia as an optimum and a ''Serbia Minor'' each
as a last substitute solution. Both local and western great power acto
rs operated counter-productively as a result of their overestimated be
lief in own power, and short-sightedness. A prolonged UN presence will
be required in order to reach a compromise between Croatia and the Kr
ajina Serbs. For some decades Bosnia-Hercegovina may have status as a
great power protectorate or be divided into three de facto independent
states. In the southern triangle a collapse of the fragile stability
may imply a risk of internationalization -created by Serbian, Macedoni
an or Albanian extreme nationalism - by attempted intervention from ou
tside. Military interventions against local adversaries would probably
do more harm than good.