EPS - YUGOSLAVIA AS A TEST-CASE

This article is a study of European Political Cooperation in the case of the Yugoslav crisis, from the outbreak of hostilities in the summer of 1991 to the end of 1992. EC policy in Yugoslavia was characterised by a high profile and ambitions to fill two different roles: the role as a peace broker and also a more interventionist role. The article a nalyses the difficulties involved in combining these roles, and the di screpancy between EC ambitions and the political skills and means avai lable. One important characteristic of the Community's involvement in the Yugoslav conflict, was its active role in the early stages of conf lict resolution. The EC immediately assumed the leading role in the pe ace process, supported by the international community at large. The EC peace conference did not achieve its aims in terms of peace making, p artially because the principle of territorial integrity was replaced b y that of self-determination, partially because the EC was not up to t he task of negotiating ceasefires. Given the absence of a security dim ension to EPC covering also military aspects, the role of the EC in pe ace keeping or other forms of military involvement was limited. This a lso in part explains why the UN assumed a more prominent role as the c onflict changed character. Judged on its own terms, the interventionis t role was more successful, although it served to undermine the role a s neutral broker. The strength of the Community was its economic lever age over Yugoslavia, which it might have utilised more effectively at an earlier stage. The requirement of unanimity in EPC blocked the reco gnition of Macedonia, which served to undermine the credibility of EC policy. In the case of Croatia and Slovenia, however, EC member states fell into line with the German view on recognition. The intergovernme ntal conference on political union, which defined a common foreign and security policy, gave impetus to the foreign policy actions of the EC in Yugoslavia.