GAMES AND STRUCTURES

Frequently applications of game theory assume, but do not show, that g ames are contained in social structures. The new analysis offered here uncovers games embedded in structures by attributing strategies to so me positions and deriving the pay-off matrices for others. As structur es vary so do the games embedded in them. All strong power structures contain prisoners' dilemma games for at least some range of pay-offs w hile some contain a chain of prisoners' dilemma games linked by defect ions. As a result, the development of interpersonal power in strong po wer structures is produced by free-riding of those low in power. Examp les of other types of structures are given and other games are found t hat do not contain defection chains. Issues of dynamics including rate s of change of power and coalition formation as a condition of counter vailing power are addressed. New experiments offer support for central formulations.