CAME THEORY AND EMOTIONS

To illustrate the rational-choice modeling of emotions, a game-theoret ic model of frustration, in which players respond in anger to their la ck of control, is developed. Of the 57 distinct 2 x 2 strict ordinal c onflict games, 12 turn out to be 'frustration games', in four of which 'threat power', based on the theory of moves, offers relief to the fr ustrated player. Aristophanes' play, Lysistrata, in which the frustrat ed women induce the men to stop fighting by abstaining from sex, illus trates the exercise of this power. Shakespeare's Macbeth, in which Lad y Macbeth, furious at her husband's vacillation, incites him to murder King Duncan, illustrates the choice of 'non-myopic equilibria' in six 'self-frustration games'. In both cases, the players, who start out a t inferior states, move initially to still worse states, exploding in anger to effect better outcomes. Conditions are given for the rational ity of such moves.