JUDGMENTS OF SOCIAL-JUSTICE - COMPROMISES BETWEEN EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY

Political economists agree that a trade-off exists between equality an d efficiency. Using a hypothetical society paradigm, we manipulated th e mean income (representing efficiency) and income variability (repres enting equality) of distributions of wealth and the correlation betwee n wealth and effort within a society. Subjects made all pairwise compa risons of distributions within societies of differing meritocracy. A ' 'maximin'' principle best described trade-off resolution strategies wh en effort and outcome were weakly linked: People maximized the minimum standard of living within a society. A compromise principle best desc ribed preferences when income was tightly linked to effort: People rej ected distributions in which some citizens fell below the ''poverty li ne'' but maximized efficiency above this constraint. Ideological polar ization was pronounced under moderate meritocracy; here liberals could focus on the role of chance and conservatives on the role of effort a nd ability.