CONSCIOUSNESS(4) - VARIETIES OF INTRINSIC THEORY

A mental-occurrence instance is conscious4 if (and when) it is an obje ct of inner (second-order) consciousness; that is, if a mental-occurre nce instance occurs and is conscious4 on that occasion, one is conscio us of it on the spot without having to take notice first of something else. In contrast, Freud's preconscious and unconscious psychical proc esses, whenever they occur, are examples of nonconscious4 mental-occur rence instances, which are not objects of inner (second-order) conscio usness; that is, one has no consciousness of them unless one (a) takes notice of something else (e.g., a behavior, a bodily change, a consci ous, mental-occurrence instance, or a brain-process recording) and (b) infers, therefrom, their occurrence. Determining how inner (second-or der) consciousness transpires will soon have high priority on the scie ntific agendas of psychologists of consciousness. To assist in their f orthcoming explanatory search, I present a straightforward survey of a number of intrinsic theories of consciousness4. Intrinsic theory hold s that any conscious4 mental-occurrence instance has itself as (inner) object, plus whatever else it may give consciousness of; it is consci ous 4 due to its own structure, not due to what happens next or later. Intrinsic theory differs from appendage theory and mental-eye theory, which both hold that a mental-occurrence instance cannot be consCious 4 on its own, cannot give any consciousness of itself, only of somethi ng else at most.