PAC CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL VOTING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE

Authors
Citation
R. Fleisher, PAC CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL VOTING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE, Legislative studies quarterly, 18(3), 1993, pp. 391-409
Citations number
45
Categorie Soggetti
Political Science
ISSN journal
03629805
Volume
18
Issue
3
Year of publication
1993
Pages
391 - 409
Database
ISI
SICI code
0362-9805(1993)18:3<391:PCACVO>2.0.ZU;2-#
Abstract
This paper analyzes how PAC contributions from defense contractors inf luence members' votes for prodefense positions on the floor of the Hou se of Representatives. Previous studies of defense voting in Congress have emphasized the powerful effects of ideological predispositions on members' roll-call votes on national defense. By contrast, PAC contri butions are hypothesized to have a marginal impact. Even at the margin s, the influence of PAC money is not likely to be the same for all mem bers; it is hypothesized to be greater for moderate members than for l iberal or conservative members. Because of the problem of simultaneous influences of PAC money and roll-call votes, a two-stage least square s estimation procedure is employed. The results once again confirm the powerful effects of ideology on defense voting but also indicate that PAC contributions exert a statistically significant (though marginal) impact even when ideological predisposition is controlled. In additio n, the results support the argument that those members with weaker ide ological predispositions are more responsive to the effects of PAC mon ey. Finally, the results indicate that, even at the margins, PAC contr ibutions from defense contractors can influence the outcome of legisla tive deliberations, especially when the vote margin is not very large.