In their meta-scientific studies of Psychology, psychologists often us
e what they take to be the views of Thomas Kuhn. Although a critical e
xamination of psychology or aspects of psychology is laudatory, psycho
logists also need to accurately understand and to assume a critical st
ance toward the meta-scientific views that they employ. In this paper
the views of the historian of science, Thomas Kuhn, are examined. The
following questions are addressed. What were Kuhn's investigative meth
ods? What are his views of science? What exactly do Kuhn's conclusions
about science mean? How does Kuhn rely on psychology? and, What does
Kuhn have to say about psychology? The extent to which psychologists f
ind Kuhn so attractive is puzzling given the significant ambiguities a
nd inconsistencies in Kuhn's views, his informal and unsystematic use
of psychology, and his disparaging comments about psychology. It is re
commended that psychologists adopt a more critical stance toward Kuhn
and that they consider other meta-scientific theories in their studies
of psychology.