STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE AS A TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS - ENGLAND PRIVATEERING WARS WITH FRANCE AND SPAIN, 1625-1630

The ''tragedy of the commons'' is the familiar problem that open acces s to a common property resource leads to overexploitation and to zero profits. A commons model is applied to an example of state sponsored p rivate violence, the practice of privateering or licensed piracy. It i s predicted that the presence of uncertainty about the value of the pr ey will reduce the amount of exploitation effort, and that industry pr ofits may be positive due to both uncertainty and heterogeneous exploi ters. Using data from England's wars with France and Spain between 162 5 and 1630, the model suggests that the commons, represented by enemy merchant shipping, was not overexploited and that privateering profits were positive. The dynamic paths of privateering effort, ships seized , and individual firm profits were, however, consistent with the norma l expectation that commons exploitation will peak and fall, as competi tion drives down returns through entry.