SKETCH FOR A PHENOMENOLOGY OF DREAMING

Dreaming as lived experience qualifies as intentional life, despite it s strangeness. Yet the dream-phenomena themselves receive little direc t clarification consistent with Edmund Husserl's major work on conscio us intentionality. With fundamental accomplishments of Husserlian phen omenology in play, how could a study of these neglected appearances be gin? First it is necessary to describe the essential relevant Husserli an concepts. From Husserl's descriptions in his phenomenological psych ology, his analysis of internal time-consciousness, and his theory of wholes and parts in Logical Investigations, the sense of intentionalit y as a streaming indivisible nexus, a double continuity of inseparable wholeness, becomes evident. Immersed in this self-awareness, we do no t find it difficult to access dream-appearances and account for their connection in intentional life. A claim can be made for their presenta tional objectivity as well as for their ''gnomonic'' subjectiviy. A sy stematic sketch of their typology or fundamental structure is thus pos sible without reducing dream-intentionality to something other than it self. Hence, a Husserlian sense of conscious lived experience is first presented. Dream evidence is then considered, despite possible bewild erment, in order to provide a clue to an extended sense of both subjec tiviy and objectivity. Lines toward a development of dream typicality are thereby indicated.