A general view of financial distress is that it results from a mismatc
h between the currently available liquid assets of a firm and its curr
ent obligations under its ''hard'' financial contracts. Mechanisms for
dealing with financial distress rectify the mismatch by either restru
cturing the assets or restructuring the financing contracts, or both.
The costs of financial distress are those resulting from the costs of
asset restructuring (converting illiquid assets to liquid ones) or the
costs of informal or formal debt restructuring. The costs of financia
l distress will have important implications for the liquidity and leve
rage policies of a firm. In particular, when the costs of financial di
stress are high, the firm may maintain a larger fraction of its assets
as liquid assets and/or be cautious in taking on debt (hard contracts
). In this study, I analyze the relationship between the costs of fina
ncial distress and (i) the corporate liquidity policy, and (ii) the le
verage policy of a firm. Liquid assets constitute a considerable porti
on of total assets and have important implications for the firm's risk
and profitability. For instance, Baskin [6] reports that among his sa
mple of 338 major U.S. corporations, 9.6% of invested capital was held
ir cash and marketable securities in 1972. In our sample of 223 major
U.S. corporations, the average annual liquidity ratio was 6.3% in the
period 1979-198 1. Kallberg [ 19] documents that top managers pay a l
ot of attention to management of corporate liquidity. In his book on l
iquidity management, Kallberg [19] provides six stages of decreasing l
iquidity as follows: (i) meeting cun-ent obligations from current cash
flows, cash balances and short-term investments; (ii) using short-ter
m credit; (iii) careful management of cash flows, e.g., through manage
ment of credit policy and inventory levels; (iv) renegotiation of debt
contracts; (v) asset sales; and (vi) bankruptcy. This scheme suggests
a direct link between liquidity policies pursued by management and co
sts of financial distress. Using various proxies for the different dir
ect and indirect costs at various stages of financial distress, its re
lationship to corporate liquidity is examined. Although several measur
es of corporate liquidity have been suggested, I focus on the accounti
ng measures of liquidity, such as the liquid ratio. A second response
to high financial distress costs is to limit the use of debt financing
. Although the inverse relationship between bankruptcy costs and lever
age has been studied previously, I will propose new measures of asset
illiquidity and indirect bankruptcy costs in exploring the relationshi
p between leverage and the costs of financial distress.1 The remainder
of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, a simple model of
dealing with financial distress is used to develop testable relations
hips between (i) distress costs and corporate liquidity policy, and (i
i) distress costs and corporate leverage. Several proxies for differen
t components of financial distress are developed in Section I.C. Metho
dology and data are described in Section II. Results are presented in
Section III. Section IV concludes.